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" Acquiescence, on our part, has been followed, at every step, by some new demand on theirs; and the " consequence has been such as always will result from a yielding disposition incessantly beseiged by greedy " importunity."——SWIFT.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AMERICAN STATES (continued from p. 921.)——Enough has, I think, been said to convince the reader, if, indeed, he wanted conviction upon the subject, that, in case of a war with the American States, no injury would arise to England; because, it has been shewn, in the article above referred to, and in others which have recently been published in this work, 1st, That it is impossible for America (let us get rid of the long compound name) to dispense with most of the goods which she can receive from no other country than England, or through English permission. 2nd, That, as to navigation, supposing our mercantile marine to be conducive to our naval strength, we derive no benefit from our commercial connection with America, seeing that all the goods which go either from England or from her colonies to America are carried in American ships; and, under the present system, must be so carried, because those which should be carried in our ships would be more heavily taxed there, where there exists a law for the purpose; so that, upon the supposition that a mercantile marine tends to give naval power to a state, our commercial connection with America tends to create unto ourselves a formidable rival upon that element, where it is, on all hands, agreed, that we ought to endeavour, at the expense of almost any sacrifice, to maintain an unrivalled superiority. 3rd, That, as to manufactures, made here for America, the hands employed therein, if not so employed, would, in a short time, find other employment, and, that, in the meanwhile, there would be, in our country, the same food for them to subsist upon, whereon they now subsist. 4th, That it is, however, within the compass of no earthly power, except ourselves, to put a stop to the supplying of America with English goods; that, if prohibited, they would be smuggled, as they were during the rebellion; that the sea coast, in case of war, would be in the quiet possession of our cruizers; that the mouths of the rivers and the rivers themselves to a considerable distance up, would be under our controul, and that while we thus kept open an inlet for goods, we should keep open an outlet for provisions for our ships. 5th, That a hundred thousand men, constantly kept in arms, would not be able to prevent this intercourse. 6th, That nineteen-twentieths of the amount of the American revenues are levied upon goods imported; that, in case of a war with us, the taxes (which would require to be augmented five-fold, at least) must be laid upon the land and upon the few manufactures of the country, and this, too, at a time, that the price of Woollens, Rum, and Coffee, would, from the prohibitions against the former, and the obstacles thrown by us in the way of the latter, be doubled. 7th, That, in such a state of things the union of the States could not be preserved, except through our folly, as, to effect a separation, we should only have to issue a proclamation, permitting any particular State or States to trade with the West-Indies, with England, and, indeed, with all the world, upon the conditions proposed by us to the Federal Government; this being all that would be necessary to confine the authority of that government to the States Southward from the Delaware, and to less than one half of the population of the country, it being evident, that the States upon the Mississippi, which have only that single outlet to the sea, only that one channel through which to receive their salt, their cloathing and their rum, *must* have that channel open, or must lose its inhabitants.——All this has, I think, been fully proved, in the several articles, recently published and referred to by me; but, because it be proved, that England would sustain little or no injury from a war with America, and that America herself would be speedily reduced thereby to a state that would compel her to submit to our terms, it does not hence follow, that those terms ought to be exorbitant; that they ought to contain any new or unjust demand; that they ought to exhibit any thing insulting to America, any thing to submit to which would degrade her in the eyes of the world: it does not follow, in short, that we ought

to make claims for the purpose of seeking a war with her; but, it does clearly follow, from the above propositions, the truth of which I take to have been proved, that we ought not to submit to any terms injurious to ourselves for the purpose of avoiding such war. What the terms are, which she aims at imposing upon us, we cannot, from the President's late speech, precisely ascertain; but, besides the point, relative to the searching of merchant ships for English deserters, and to concede which would be openly to encourage desertion from our ships of war; besides this point, which is vitally interesting to us, it would seem that Mr. Thomas Jefferson has some very large views respecting the exercise of our naval power; and that, in short, it is his wish to co-operate with Napoleon, in the great undertaking of securing "*the freedom of the seas*," or, in other words, the annihilation of that part of our power, which is the only means of preserving our independence as a nation; an undertaking in which, I trust, they will find themselves frustrated and put to confusion. ——But, it may be, that America may consent to stop short, in the first instance, of the full extent of her demands. If, however, we yield, in whatever degree our yielding may be, her demands will, in that same degree, increase. Observe the curs, that pour out upon the passing mastiff. If he stop and only look them hard in the face, they stop too, casting an eye back to the doors whence they have issued, to see if their retreat be open. He moves on his way; they advance again; and, if, from their numbers, he discovers any symptoms of fear, they are upon him, have him down, worry him and tear him half to death. By boldly seizing upon the first aggressor (if that be the course he pursues), and sending him back howling to his retreat, he stops and silences the malignant confederation, is enabled to go on his way with safety and with honour, and that, too, not only for the present, but upon all future occasions. —— The fear, which for reasons presently to be stated, we have discovered of America, has led to our present quarrel with her; and, it has led also, in a great degree, to the partiality existing in that country for France. When the question is "to whom shall we bow?" men never determine to bow to those whom they know to be afraid of them; and they seldom refuse to do it to those whom they fear.——The conduct of America towards England presents a series of aggressions of fifteen years, with scarcely a month's interruption. No sooner had the war broken out, between England and France, in 1792, than the Americans openly avowed their wishes for the success of the latter. I do not mean, in their newspapers, I mean in the speeches of the members of the Congress, where, the utmost extent of the arguments on the other side, was, that it was not for the *benefit* of America to join France in the war. These wishes, accompanied with the most outrageous abuse of the king of England and of the English navy and of the English nation, were openly professed, and, at public meetings, proclaimed, in the most authoritative and solemn manner, by magistrates, judges, and governors; and, this, too, observe, without any reproof on the part of the general government, some of whose officers actually joined in these injurious invectives. From words they proceeded to deeds. Individuals not only violated the laws of neutrality; but, when they had so done, boasted of their success, and incurred, at no time, the displeasure of that government, who stood upon the professed ground of strict and impartial neutrality. Nay, that government itself scrupled not to imitate, in this respect, its malignant citizens. A large fleet of American merchant ships, laden with provisions on account of the government of France, being collected at Norfolk, in Virginia, and being nearly ready to sail, at the time when it was thought proper to lay an embargo upon all merchant ships whatever, this large fleet, under convoy of a French force, was suffered to proceed on its destination, while the law of embargo was rigorously enforced (both before and after the sailing of that fleet) with respect to all the ships bound to the ports of England or her colonies. Say, for argument's sake, that it was not in the power of the government to prevent the sailing of this fleet, so useful to France at that critical moment; but, not to observe, that its power, if not efficient for all cases, should not have been exercised against us any more than against France; not to mention this, it is a fact not to be denied, that, though the law of embargo provided a penalty for all those who should violate it, yet, that not one of those who were guilty of an open violation thereof, by sending or taking out their ships in this fleet, ever underwent the penalty; and that, so well were they satisfied, that they had nothing to fear upon this account, they openly boasted of the violation they had committed, and which to have committed became, in some sort, a title to public esteem.——At a later period of the war (to pass over the endless list of minor acts of partiality), the people and public authorities of New York, openly and boastingly gave aid and

assistance to the French frigate, the Ambuscade, in a battle, fought by her, against the English frigate, the Boston. It will be remembered, that the former, which was lying under the forts of New York, received a challenge from the latter, lying then out at the mouth of the harbour; that the battle ended in the death of the gallant Captain Courtenay, who had given the challenge, and in the defeat of the Ambuscade, which, though of 44 guns against her enemy's 36 (I believe), saved herself from capture by a flight, which she effected, while the Boston was obliged to lye-to, having a mast gone by the board. Previous to the combat, which the French delayed for the purpose, assistance of all sorts was sent to the French frigate from the shore; several port pilots agreed, by lot, to serve on board of her; men were taken from the American ships in the harbour to add to her crew; additional surgeons from the shore were provided; and, at last, out she went under the French and American flags entwined, while the people on shore, under banners entwined in a similar manner, shouted an anticipated triumph. When she returned, without the prize; beaten and shattered, and stained with the blood of many of the malignant wretches, who had volunteered to give England a stab, a public contribution was made to provide wine, linen, and other things for those who had been wounded in the combat; and, while, from public meetings, consisting in part of men in authority, revenge for the failure and disgrace was sought in abuse the most infamous against the English nation and name, the general government, which, in the observance of its solemn promise of impartial neutrality, was bound to animadvert upon these proceedings, suffered all to pass in a silence which indicated that its secret wishes but too well corresponded with those of the open violators of that neutrality, and that, in short, the line of neutrality had been adopted merely for the purpose of tying the hands of England.——The laws of neutrality demand, a perfect impartiality, not only in *granting* and *refusing*, but also in resenting injuries. It is notorious, and I have hundreds of proofs to produce of the fact, that, while remonstrance upon remonstrance was made by the American government against what it called the agressions of England, the well known and outrageous aggressions of France produced no complaint or remonstrance at all; that the sufferers were referred to the great and sovereign balm of hurt minds, patience; and that, finally, when, under the Presidentship of Mr. Adams, a shew of obtaining redress for the thousands of injuries, received from France, was made, no redress was obtained, but that, in the accommodation, the government submitted to new injuries to America, and that, too, for the obvious purpose, of producing injury to England.——During the nine years beginning in 1792 and ending 1800, there were many flagrant outrages committed in America against the English envoys, not one of which was noticed by the government. During the same period, publications against the king and people of England, such as never were conceived unless in an American mind, teemed in the newspapers, in pamphlets, and in books. The abuse contained in these publications it is impossible to describe. Never did the government notice one of them; but, the moment a publication appeared against their *allies*, (for so they called France, and, afterwards, Spain), it armed itself with all its powers; the general government and the under government fastened upon the offender both at once, for one and the same publication; in their bills of indictment, their attorney general shared the paragraphs of the same publication between them, so that if one failed the other might succeed! And, yet, did this people, at that very time, carry on its commerce, to all parts of the world, under the guise of neutrality; and of all this, too, were our ministers at home duly informed, though they never resented it, a forbearance, an acquiescence under injustice, for which we have since dearly paid, and shall continue dearly to pay.——Let us now come to the treaty of 1794, and see how it was fulfilled by this nation, to whom we are now called upon, by the Morning Chronicle and its Whig writers, to make further concessions of our maritime rights, for the sake of preserving that harmony, which they assert (and, I have proved, assert falsely) to be absolutely necessary to the prosperity of England.——The principal stipulation in that treaty related to reciprocal *pecuniary claims*. Upon the bare mention of this the reader will think that he anticipates the sequel; but, unless he be already well informed upon the subject, I defy his imagination to arm him against the astonishment that will arise from the hearing of what I am going to relate.——The stipulation, here mentioned, arose out of the following circumstances. At the breaking out of the rebellion (for, I love to call things by their right names), there were large sums of money, as there necessarily must be, due from merchants and others in America, to merchants and manufacturers in England. There was money due to others; but this may serve as a general description. As soon

as Franklin, the arch-rebel, had felt the pulse of France, sufficiently to ascertain that that country would take part with America, the Congress passed a law, according to which the debtors above-mentioned, were, upon the payment of the amount of the debts into their state treasury in paper money, to be for ever released from the claim of their English creditors. This paper money was not, at the time, worth more, perhaps, than sixpence in the pound; so that here was a most powerful and extensively operating motive for adhering to the Congress, for, if England triumphed, these claims of the English creditor resumed all their former vigour. Indeed, thus to get rid of their just debts was the principal motive of the rebellion itself; and this is a fact that no honest man in America will deny. It suited those debtors to feign other motives; to persuade other people that a stamp-duty was the most burdensome and disgraceful of badges; but, if their eyes had not before been open, they would have been in the reign of Mr. Adams, when a stamp'duty, a thousand times heavier than that proposed by England, was imposed by the Congress, and quietly paid.——When peace came to be made, the English minister, Lord Shelburne, in consequence of a promise solemnly, but very foolishly, made to the above-mentioned creditors, obtained a stipulation, that the Congress (or general government of America) should cause to be adopted, in the several States, such laws, or regulations, as would open the way for those creditors to recover their due. It was unjust towards this nation to obtain any such stipulation, because it must have cost something to its general interests, or honour, at the expence of which these creditors had no better claim to be indemnified than any other description of persons had to be indemnified for any losses, in taxes, or otherwise, that they might have sustained from the war. It was to lay down a precedent for indemnifying speculators against risks, than which nothing could be more unjust in itself, or more pernicious in its consequences, though, I would fain hope, that those consequences will not extend to an indemnification of the merchants trading to Buenos Ayres and to Denmark. It was, however, more foolish, if possible, than unjust; because, any man, with one grain of sense in his head, might have perceived, that it was morally impossible that the stipulation should ever be fulfilled.——When the treaty of 1794 came to be negociated, these debts remained in the same state that they were found in at the peace. It was agreed, therefore (and now we come to the interesting point), that a board of commissioners should be formed, which board (to sit in America) was to ascertain, and, finally, decide upon, the amount due to each creditor; that their decision should be final and without appeal; and, that, according to such decision, the general government of America was to cause the sums due to be fully paid.——But, there had arisen, in 1794, claims of certain American merchants and others upon England for the amount of ships and goods, which, as they alledged, had been unjustly taken from them by our navy during the war then going on (that is, the last war with France); and, therefore we agreed, that another board of commissioners should be formed to ascertain those claims; this board was to sit in London; was to decide in the last resort like the other board; and our government agreed to pay the sums due agreeably to such decision.——The manner of forming the boards was this: each government was to name two commissioners for the first board. These four commissioners, when met, were to name another on each side, and then, by ballot, they were to determine, which of these two should be the fifth commissioner. The second board was to be formed in the same manner; and, it happened, that, for the board to sit in America, the ballot was in favour of the fifth commissioner named by us; while, for the board to sit in England, the ballot was on the contrary side. Thus, then, both the boards were formed, we having named three out of the five for one board, and the Americans having named three out of five for the other. Nothing could be more fair; nothing could promise a fairer termination, especially as the decision was, in all cases, to be by a majority of voices of the commissioners present, three of whom, to provide against cases of sickness, were to form a quorum for the transaction of business.——But, in the tail of this stipulation, there was a little member of a sentence worked in, that, no award for any payment should be made, without one, at least, of the commissioners, nominated by each government respectively, being *present*; and, as the reader will see, this little bit of a sentence was turned to such excellent account by the Americans, that, by the help of it, they made shift to render the whole of the stipulation, as far as it operated against themselves, perfectly nugatory. ——The boards met, and that which assembled in America, was, after a year, or more (I believe more than two years), spent upon preliminary matter, just coming to a decision upon one out of perhaps, five

thousand cases; but, it should be observed, that the decision upon that case would have applied to, perhaps, two thirds of the whole, and therefore the remainder of the work would have been short. The board was just coming to this decision; just going to make an award, which would have made the American government liable to be called upon for a sum of money due to an English creditor, when what did the two American commissioners, FITZSIMMONS and SITGREAVES (their names should be remembered); what did they do, but jump up and quit the room instantly; and, as the treaty required that one of them, at least, should be *present*, when an award was made, *no award could, of course, be made!* The board met, and they came to it several times afterwards; but, the moment any question touching an award was made, they seceded. Many attempts were made to bring them to act; but, all in vain, and, except in one or two little insignificant cases which had no community in principle with the great mass of the claims, nothing was decided. The board broke up, and the whole stipulation, attended (as in some future article I shall take an opportunity of exposing) with an immense present expense, and even with a permanent future charge, on our part. ——Not so the board assembled in London for the awarding of money to be paid by us to American claimants. The commissioners of that board made dispatch; there was no *secession* there. There the American commissioners composed a *majority*; and awards went on at a swimming rate, John Bull being, as all the world has experienced, no niggard of his money, earning it like a horse and spending it like an ass. When Pitt and his comrades found, however, how things were going on in America, they seemed to think that it was too scandalous to suffer awards to be going on here; and, accordingly, the board in London was stayed in its operations. In this state the famous Richmond Park minister found the affair. He began, or took up the thread of, a new negociation, and delightful work did he turn off his hand; for, either he found it so hampered, or he found himself hampered with so many other things, that he cut the matter short thus: he made a new convention, in which it was agreed, that, as a full and final satisfaction for all debts, due from the American debtors above spoken of to English creditors, the American government should pay, by yearly instalments, the sum of *six hundred thousand pounds*, when the calculation, at the out-set of the business was, that those debts amounted to *twenty millions of dollars*, that is to say, between *four and five millions of pounds.*—— "Well!" the reader will say, "but this "economical minister, this conscientious "gentleman, took care to compound in "like manner for the debts alledged to be "due from us to the Americans? He surely, put an end to the board in London, "where the Americans had a *majority* of "commissioners?" No: he did no such thing; he suffered that board to go on, as if nothing amiss had taken place, and, we have, out of the taxes of this kingdom, already actually paid, on account of the awards of that board, more, I believe, than *three millions of pounds*, not having yet arrived at nearly the end of the reckoning; though, at the time when the treaty was made, the utmost extent of these demands was estimated at less than *one million and a half!* ——Well may you, reader, throw down the Register and bite your lips. I curse as I write; and you must be something "more or less than man," if you do not curse as you read.——After this, can any one be surprized, that the Americans should expect to bully us out of our maritime rights? Really, when they consider our past tame, cowardly, base and fool-like acquiescence, one is rather surprized at their modesty (a quality, albeit, with which they are not, in general, overcharged) in confining their demands to the "*freedom of the seas.*" This demand, unreasonable on the part of any nation, and unsupportably insolent on the part of a nation like them, I have here traced to its source, that disposition to recede and to yield on the part of our ministers, and which disposition is to be attributed to the at once selfish and silly motive of preserving harmony, for the sake, not of the tranquillity and ease of the nation, but for the sake of commerce and consequent revenue, thinking, if they ever do think rationally upon such matters, that the duty paid upon American goods the people will not perceive to come out of their own pockets. They have, too, been worried and tormented by the merchants and great exporting manufacturers and American fund-holders, who, together with a faction, everlastingly fighting for place, have made them glad to get off their hands, at any rate, a dispute with America. But, why are these merchants and fund-holders *alarmed?* I can speak comfort to their hearts. In the ever-famous treaty of 1794, there is a permanent stipulation, that, if war should at any future time, unhappily take place between the two nations, there shall be no confiscation of debts,

funds, or property of any sort on *either* side (just as if we did not know to whom it applied!); but, that all shall remain safe. "Aye," say they, "but the *war puts an* "*end to the treaty*; and it was pure folly "in Lord Grenville to insert such an un- "meaning stipulation." Yes, but, observe, the stipulation is preceded by a most *important* declaration, namely, *that it is unjust and base* (I forget the precise words) *to have recourse to such confiscations*; and, do you think, that the Americans, after having, in so solemn a manner, made that declaration; do you think, I say, that after that, they will attempt to confiscate? What do you shake your heads for, and shrug up your shoulders? Have you no faith? Are you Jews there too?——This is the bane, this is the curse of England, as relating to her foreign connections. Blessed with all sorts of resources necessary to the happiness and greatness of a nation, those resources, instead of remaining within herself, assume, through the intervention of commerce, a shape that deposits a considerable part of her wealth, and, along with it, the affections of no small number of the most opulent, active and intriguing of her people, in foreign countries; and, therefore it is, that her interests are made to give way to the interests of those countries, the case of nations being, in this respect, precisely the opposite of that of individuals, for, in the latter case, the debtor is in a great degree the slave of the creditor, whereas, in the former, the creditor is the slave of the debtor; and that, too, observe, exactly in proportion to the amount of the debt and the badness of character of the debtor. I should like to hear MR. SPENCE, who can see *no evil*, though he can see no good, in commerce, give his reasons for believing, that that which I have here stated is not an evil.——Here I should take my leave of this subject for the present; but, another letter from A. B., the writer, who, through the pages of the Morning Chronicle, under the garb of an Englishman, has been, like Satan at the ear of Eve, insinuating his advice into the public mind, demands some notice, especially as the wiseman of the Morning Chronicle has thought proper to intimate, that the *great demand for the letters of that writer has induced him to reprint them in a pamphlet*. This is a mere catch-penny trick on his part, and a little effusion of vanity on the part of the writer, who, I venture to engage, is to pay all the expenses of the reprint. As far as all this goes, the thing is contemptible; but, it becomes serious when we consider, that the Morning Chronicle would not have commended these letters, *had they not expressed the sentiments of his faction*, against which faction, therefore, let us be upon our guard. ——I shall insert the *whole* of this letter. Don't be alarmed, reader; for, being the last of the litter it is appropriately short.——

"Sir,—In *sending* these few lines to you, "it is not my intention to renew my corre- "spondence; but it appears proper that I "should ask of you to take notice, that "when I wrote the last letter, and, indeed, "when it appeared in your paper, I had "not seen the speech of the President to "the Congress of the United States, al- "though it had been published in London. "If I had read it, there are parts of it to "which I should have adverted, but with "great reserve, and not at all in the style "of several animadversions on it which are "in circulation, the justice or injustice of "which it is not my intention to consider. "The simple forms of a republican govern- "ment would not have made me forget, "that the paper signed "Thomas Jefferson" "was the public speech of a sovereign, and "of a sovereign still in amity with Great "Britain; of a sovereign, besides, address- "ing the representatives of his people, who "thought their independence questioned, "and who were in impatient expectation of "receiving the answer of Great Britain on "the subject. It is not only injurious to "the country, but even unfair to ministers, "who are engaged in a most important and "critical negociation, to run, before their "ambassador and their dispatches, with the "language of intemperance and reproach. "It would, no doubt, be very desirable, "that the councils of other states should "view all the transactions of England with "English eyes and English feelings; but "that is not to be expected at any time; "least of all in the present moment, when "there remains but one nation to complete "the confederacy of the world.——I do "not mean that the English press should be "silent, or should hold back the language "of truth: but there is a measure to be ob- "served on such occasions, which, in ma- "ny instances, has been overstepped.——I "think it should be left to the administra- "tion of our own government, in the dig- "nified language of state representations, "to question the acts of another government "where they appear to be unfriendly or un- "just, instead of harsh and violent invec- "tives, written without due information, "and written in a style, which, in a man- "ner, identifies the authors with the admi- "nistration which they profess to serve and "to support.——It may be asked, how ano-

" nymous publications can affect the temper " of a foreign government or people? The " best answer is, to recollect how we our- " selves are affected by the tirades in the " Moniteur. We think ourselves at liberty, " and, in my opinion, rightly, to impute " them to the French government; and " the inhabitants of other countries, who " know the present state of the British " press, will draw the same conclusion.—— " All I mean by these observations is, to re- " commend some forbearance in the man- " ner of some of these compositions, and " to explain why I myself forbear from add- " ing any thing to what is contained in my " former correspondence.—— I have not " sufficient materials before me for any pub- " lic criticism upon the important state pa- " per of America. If peace is happily pre- " served, and harmony restored, it will be " pleasant to those who have no intemperate " language to regret, or to retract; and if " the peace is unjustly broken, it will then " be patriotism to expose that injustice, to " support the councils, and to assist the " arms of *our* country.—A. B."——As it matters little at which end we begin, let us, for once, proceed in a regular course from the top to the bottom.—Mr. A. B. "*sends*" this letter to the editor, keeping up the character, assumed in the first letter, of a person "retired from the busy scenes of " life, and living, in the country, a calm " observer of what passes in the great " world." This is an instance of American cunning over-reaching itself. What occasion was there for A. B. to say any thing at all about *who* or *what* he was? He might be sure, that his facts and his arguments would pass for what they were intrinsically worth. For the purposes of *truth*, it was impossible that an assumption of character should be necessary; and, therefore, we have pretty good reason for suspecting, that it was assumed for the purposes of falsehood. In romances, and in certain moral essays, an asumption of character is proper and useful; but, then, it is understood to be an assumption; whereas, in a case like this, we are left to doubt, at the least, whether the character be real or assumed. My opinion is, that this writer is either an American, or a person deeply interested in American debts, or property of some sort or other; and, this opinion, expressed before, receives confirmation from the letter now before us.—— A. B. tells us, that, when he wrote his last letter (the main object of which was to prevail on us not to stick at small sacrifices, for the sake of restoring harmony between us and America) he had not seen the President's speech: True, perhaps, but, he had anticipated its contents; he had anticipated the insolent demands of America, and, so had I, without seeing that speech.—He censures the manner in which some of the English prints have commented upon that speech; says, that, if he had thereunto adverted, it would have been with *great reserve*: that, as to the *justice*, or *injustice*, of our comments, it is not his intention to enter into any consideration; but, that he would have us beware, that, though the simple forms of a republican government, caused the speech to be signed "THOMAS JEFFERSON," it is the speech of a *sovereign*.—How neatly the vanity of the American peeps out here through the *simplicity* of the republican. "Simple forms," indeed! Just as if this miserable affectation would any longer impose upon the world, when it is the subject of ridicule amongst the Americans themselves!—But, why, if this man were an Englishman, and had an English heart in his breast, should he refrain from commenting freely upon the speech? Why should he recommend such "*great reserve*" in doing it? Why, he tells us, below, that he himself " has not sufficient *materials* before him for " any public criticism upon the *important* " state paper of America." Now, leaving the vanity here again to the contempt of the reader, let me ask this gentleman, what *materials* he could possibly want for such a criticism, other than the speech itself and facts which are matter of notoriety? We hear the president, for instance, complaining of the attack upon the Chesapeake, and mentioning that seamen were taken out of her by force; but, we hear him say nothing at all about the nation to which the men belonged, though, in his proclamation, he had declared them to be natives of the American States; nor does he advert, in the slightest manner, to the facts relating to the way in which the men came on board of the Chesapeake. There are falshoods of omission as well as falshoods of commission. I inveigle away a dozen of my neighbours sheep and huddle them into my flock; he comes and takes them away, giving me, who attempt to resist him, a good, decent well-merited drubbing. I go to the parson and tell him, that my neighbour has come into my field and fetched away by force a dozen sheep; " and," say I, " because " I attempted to resist him, he has drubbed " me in the manner that you see." The parson, who has heard the whole of the story before, naturally answers me thus: " Soft- " ly; you have told the truth, but not " the *whole* truth; and, when by such

" suppressions, it necessarily follows, " that a false impression will be pro- " duced upon the minds of those who " require information upon the subject, the " statement of part of the truth is, in fact, " *a lie*; therefore, you have told me a lie; " and, as lying lips are an abomination to " the Lord, I hope you will lose no time in " seeking pardon by the way of sincere re- " pentance."—Leaving the application of this to A. B. and his admirer of the Morning Chronicle, let us take one other instance. The President tells the Congress, that England has adopted a regulation with respect to neutral trade, which regulation is greatly injurious to America; and, by-and-by, he says, that he has nothing to complain of in the conduct of any other nation of Europe, or words to that effect. But, he omits to tell the Congress and the *poor deceived people*, that the regulation he complains of was forced upon us by a previous regulation of France, the latter far surpassing ours, both in severity and extent, and that, to this, America had submitted for many months before our regulation was put in practice. This he omitted to say; and, therefore, this case is precisely upon a level with the former in point of morality, but, with the addition, that, here, there is an instance of partiality for our enemy, quite sufficient to deprive America of all pretensions to the *neutral* character. Now, then, without troubling ourselves with any more particulars, what " *materials*," I again ask, could A. B. want to enable him to make a public criticism upon these most important parts of the speech? Evidently none but what every man was in possession of; and, therefore, we must conclude, that his unwearied pen was stopped, only because he found that a *defence* of the speech would not do; for, as to any dread of exposing himself to further defeat and ridicule, thoughts of that sort never enter the mind of a conceited sot, such as he appears to be, and such as his country abounds in.——But, it is the *manner* of our criticism, the *harshness* of our language (pretty well in an American!) that he finds fault with; and, he begs us to consider, that the speech was addressed to the representatives of a people, " who " thought their *independence* questioned." What an impudent falshood! Coolly to state this in an English news-paper, required nothing short of the impenetrable skin of an American. Thought their *independence* questioned, because we would not suffer them to keep English sailors that they had inveigled away from our ships! If he had said, indeed, that they felt sore at the reflection, that their ship had been so shamefully beaten, there would have been some sense in his words; but, to talk of their feeling alarm upon the score of their *independence* surpasses the impudence of our own corrupt hirelings, who, when an attack is made upon a notorious public plunderer, or a not less notorious cowardly general, call it an attack upon *the constitution*, and accuse the assailant of a settled design to undermine the throne, to bring about revolution, anarchy, a destruction of all property and universal carnage," leaving darkness to be the bu- " rier of the dead." It is seldom that knaves are at a loss for a catch word, wherewith to entrap honest credulity: here the word is *constitution*; in America it is *independence*; but, for mercy's sake, let us not be duped on both sides; let us not be persuaded to believe, that, if we insist upon recovering our sailors out of the American ships, we thereby aim a blow at the *independence* of America!——It is, however, the *manner* that he complains of. " I do not mean," says he, " that the English press should be " *silent*" (gramercy, kind Sir!) " or should " hold back the language of truth; but, " there is a *measure* to be observed upon " such occasions, which, in many instances, " has been overstepped." I understand you, Sir; our papers should not speak *too much truth*, a caution, which, from their established character, I should have thought quite unnecessary. As truth is a valuable thing, you wish them, I perceive, to dispense it, in imitation of your " *sovereign*," Thomas Jefferson, with an economical hand. ——Come, then, supposing you to mean to confine your complaint solely to the *language*, that is to say, to the mere words, used by the writers, to whom you allude, you tell us, that the language of our public prints is, and you think ought to be, considered to be the language of our government, and that they are, in fact, in this respect, identified. Agreed; and, you will of course, agree, that the American prints are identified with the American government, and, then, pray do tell us, what ought, in this country, to be the feelings with respect to that government? How we ought to resent all the atrocious abuse which the American press from its three hundred throats, has vomited out against our navy, our nation, and our name? In return for the appellations of " swindlers, cowards, ruf- " fians, murderers, assassins," with which that press has so profusely decorated us, are we to return, " honest Americans, " gallant republicans, gentle citizens, com- " passionate souls, sweet sirs?" However

this might agree with your ideas of justice, we shall not do it. I have seen nothing in the articles, to which you allude (for until now, I have made no commentary upon the speech myself), but what was perfectly proper, as far as related to America; nor did I observe, in those articles, one expression that could justly be called harsh. But, this tenderness for *yourselves* is, to me, no new thing. I know that you claim, in virtue of the praises, which many honest Europeans, have, from the want of knowing the truth, bestowed upon your national character, a right to abuse all the world, and, at the same time, to be exempt even from fair criticism yourselves, a right of which you might have lived in the fancied enjoyment, had not your vanity urged you on to attempt to bully us out of our maritime rights, and, with your dung-hill chicken crow to bid the eagle defiance.——You ground your recommendation of forbearance upon the circumstance, that we have now such a host of foes to contend with: and, most significantly bid us reflect, that "there remains but *one nation* to complete the confederacy of the world against us;" a hint that you find, I dare say, to agree wonderfully well with what you said in your former letter, to wit, that "England stood upon the *vantage ground*, and that nothing conceded by her *could possibly be imputed to fear*." Your tone is now changed, and like your honest predecessor, NIC FROG, you have a mind to try what bullying will do, since, to all appearance, wheedling has failed. But, Sir, I hope, you and your country will find that the days both of wheedling and of bullying are passed; we see this confederacy now formed, and you do not perceive that we are scared out of our wits. The scaring days are gone by; and though we have manifold political sins to get rid of, you will not easily scare us again. We begin to discover, that though America and her commerce were both annihilated, and all other commerce along with them, the corn and the grass and the trees would still continue to grow in England; that our mines would still teem with ore and with fuel; that our women would still be the fairest and the most virtuous in the world, our men the most industrious, honest and sincere, while they yielded to none upon earth in strength or in bravery. This is a discovery which merchants and merchant-like ministers can no longer prevent us from completing; and, once completed, away go all the false alarms, all the mental chains, which have so long held us in disgraceful bondage to nations like Holland and America.——To return again, for a moment, to your caution about forbearance in our language, the fact is, that you are afraid of *the truth*. You have humbugged the world so long with your impudent assumption of exclusive *virtue* and *liberty*, that your vanity falls into fits at the prospect of seeing the English press let loose upon you. Your situation is like that of Joseph Surface, just when Sir Peter is going behind the screen; and, in that situation I leave you, not however, without a faithful promise to return to you again, as often as occasion shall require.——And, now, what will our ministers do? Will they make further concessions? Will they drawl out a negociation, ending in a disgraceful compromise, invented by some little knot of merchants and manufacturers, and just leaving a hole to creep out of in point of form, while, as to the substance, they close us up air-tight in debasement? Will they do this? I do not know how to answer. I should, at once, answer *no*; but, there is so much depending upon connections and intrigues and votings and the other wheels and works of faction, that I know not what to think or to say. And yet, the policy as well as the justice of the case are so obvious; they must all be so well convinced, that to recoil one inch further, is to invite a trampling to death; they must so clearly see, that their country's fate, and, indeed, their own political fate too, depends upon their resolute resistance of further demands on the part of America; they must be so well satisfied, that America is now merely the mouth-piece of France, demanding that which, if granted, will be a precedent for every future treaty that we shall make, relating to maritime affairs: of all this they must be so thoroughly convinced, that one would think it impossible for them to hesitate. Yet, I will not vouch for their firmness; and, I see, that the Morning Chronicle, taking up the ragged thread of A. B. and working it into a substance somewhat more solid, is endeavouring to connect it with the meshes of faction. "We yesterday," says he, in a tone perfectly puritanical, "received American papers down to "the 12th of last month. That part of "the President's speech, which relates to "the differences subsisting between Great "Britain and America, has been referred "to a committee of the House of Repre-"sentatives; but it was not likely, that, "any decisive measure would be adopted "till the sentiments and intentions of this "Government were better known. The "discussion which took place upon the

" resolutions seems to have been conducted " with great moderation, and we would " fain hope that the wisdom of the respec- " tive legislatures of the two countries " will awe into silence the clamour of the " few intemperate and unthinking indivi- " duals, who for the sake of gratifying a " blind and inconsiderate passion, would " hurry them into a war equally injurious " to the interests of both. It is no small " consolation, especially in the days in " which we live, to reflect that there still " exist two countries in the globe, the " pacific relations of which are not subject " to the arbitrary controul of an individual, " or of twelve individuals, and where the " happiness and prosperity of the people " cannot be sacrificed either to misplaced " partialities or to ill-conceived opinions. " Such is the wisdom and benignity of our " institutions, that it is impossible for us to " envy those of any other nation; but it " surely is matter of regret that at a mo- " ment so critical and important the Bri- " tish Parliament should not, like the Ame- " rican Congress, be advising and directing " the measures of the Executive Govern- " ment. Whatever may be the issue of " the discussions now pending, it would be " desirable, even in a political point of " view, that it should be the result, not " merely of the deliberations of a Council, " but that the people themselves should " decide upon their own destinies. In this " way the greatest evil which can befal " humanity (for we are not yet converts " to the new theory which holds out war as " desirable on its own account), would be " most likely to be avoided, and, if found " to be unavoidable, would be encountered " with a spirit proportionate to its necessi- " ty."——No, they will certainly come to no decisive measure upon the subject, in the Congress, until the intentions of our government are known; and, that alone is a strong presumptive proof, that if we remain firm, they will cease their demands. They are happily gifted in the art of prolonging a discussion. The debates upon the treaty of 1794 took up *fourteen days*, and, even at the end of that time, several members complained that they had had no opportunity of delivering their sentiments, though, after the first day, there was not one new idea brought forth. What head-ache-giving speeches! Some of them spoke *seven hours*, without so much as sucking an orange.——We are to fret, according to this writer, because the parliament of England, in imitation of the American Congress, is not assembled to " *advise* and " *direct the measures of the executive* " *government.*" In the first place, it is not true, that the Congress is called for that purpose; it is called, that the speech may be made, and the speech is made for *our* use, and not for the use of the Congress or the people of America. And, in the next place, what has our parliament (where the ministry has a majority too), to do, either in *theory*, or in *practice*, with negociations with foreign powers? But, it is " desirable that the *people*" should have a hand in the discussions. Well, and will they have any more hand in them, when the parliament is met, than they have now? They can petition the parliament, and publish their petitions. And, cannot they petition the king now, in the very same sentiments, publishing their petitions in like manner? Yes, but " our friends can *make speeches*." Oh, their tongues itch to be at it again, do they? " The *people themselves* " decide upon their own destinies!" What an impudent, what an insolent, and, at the same time, foolish expression! What have the people to do in deciding? And what difference is it to them, whether the measures be first decided upon in the Council, or in the House of Commons, seeing that the ministers have a majority, and seeing that the measures will be such as they shall propose? For my part, I think parliament will meet full soon enough in February, or March; and, I was going to say . . . . . but I won't. No: I hope, we shall have no parliament sitting until after the Epiphany, old style, that we may have a quiet, if not a merry Christmas, and a happy beginning, at least, of the New Year. I am not, however, so divested of feeling as not to compassionate the case of those, who have itching tongues; nor should I be unwilling to indulge them, could I obtain a security, that they have not also itching fingers.——The conclusion of this article from the Morning Chronicle is in the true strain of the conventicle, nor should I wonder if the writer had heard the very same words at Moorfields or in Glass-house Yard; that is to say, it is made up of cant and false insinuations. When did this hypocritical writer hear any one say, that " war was *desirable on its own account?*" Where has he seen any thing of this " new theory," of which he talks, and which, he leaves to be inferred, is held by all those, who wish to refuse the demands of the Americans? And, if he cannot point out this *when* and *where*, with what face can he object to own himself to be a hypocrite? ——No, Sir, we do not hold, that war is desirable on its own account. We will tell

you what we hold, and we will not be put off with any of your shuffling. We will bring you to the point. And, if you refuse to answer, your silence shall be presumed to be a proof of your guilt.——America demands, that we should, 1st, *give up the right of taking our seamen out of her merchant ships*; and, 2nd, *permit her to carry on her commerce, as a neutral, upon terms more advantageous than those, which she quietly suffers France to prescribe to her?*——We are for war, rather than yield to these demands. Now, are you with us, or are you against us? Give us a direct answer to this, and think not to get off with shuffling and insinuation. Answer, Sir. If your cause be good, why need you be afraid of trying your strength with us? Your faction is considerable, and you yourself have some resources in point of talent. Face us, then; and put up your quibbling and canting and insinuating until your beloved meeting of parliament arrives.

An article respecting *the appointment of officers in the army*; another respecting the *Russian manifesto*; another respecting the *state of Spain*; and many letters, are postponed for want of room, which I had not to spare without dividing Mr. Worthington's letter, which I could not prevail upon myself to do.——The next Number, which will conclude this Volume, will contain all the *public papers* up to Tuesday or Wednesday next.

ERRORS in the last Register.—Page 904, l. 22 from the bottom, read *owe* instead of *have*.——Page 913, l. 27 from the top, read *it* instead of *they*.

COBBETT'S

Parliamentary History

OF

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Which, in the compass of Sixteen Volumes, royal octavo, double columns, will contain a full and accurate Report of all the recorded Proceedings, and of all the Speeches, in both Houses of Parliament, from the earliest times to the year 1803, when the publication of "Cobbett's Par-" liamentary Debates" commenced.

Vol. III. Comprising the Period from the Battle of Edge-hill in 1642 to the Restoration of Charles II. in 1660, will be ready for delivery on Friday, the 1st of January, 1808.—The magnitude of the Parliamentary History, the great labour and expence attending it, and the comparatively small number of copies, which, to avoid serious risk, it has been thought adviseable to print, render it necessary, thus early, to adopt precautions calculated to prevent any broken sets remaining on hand at the conclusion of the work. Subscribers are, therefore, particularly requested to send in their Names to their respective Booksellers, as no Copies will, on any account, be sold, but to the purchasers of the former Volumes.

EDINBURGH REVIEWERS.

[*Being Mr. Worthington's third and last letter*]

" Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis
" Tempus eget.————————"

SIR;——I have reserved for my last letter, an examination of the Observations of the Reviewers, " upon the true nature and " operations of our famous constitution," (p. 411, Edinburgh Review). This is the most elaborate part of their essay; and very judiciously so. For, if they are able to shew, that the three estates of our legislature, preserving their separate independent functions, cannot act *beneficially*, their critique is so far triumphant, and the argument for the constitution becomes an old woman! It will be my endeavour to winnow every party consideration out of this discussion, which has been obviously undertaken by the Reviewers to serve the purposes of party. Their object, clearly disclosed by their concluding page, is to support the credit of the late ministry, in order to turn out the present. The scheme was adroit. For if they can demonstrate, that what we call abuses, are real improvements, reforms were out of the question; Mr. Fox was no apostate, and the Whig ministry is justified in respect of every thing, but its *former professions*.—— They begin (for the purpose, I believe, of perplexing the reader and the subject) with an analytical dissection of " every commu-" nity with a relation to its political rights " and interests into three great natural class-" es and orders:" in none of which, by the way, is the division necessary or *natural*; and which, whether 3, or 300 divisions had been assumed, would have proved nothing at all in the argument. What will the reader think, for example, of the *sovereign* permanent, and the father of his people; from whom, his interests cannot be separated, being classed with the whole pack of *times serving* placemen!—Dignified by the appellation of " *public functionaries!*" I will only notice one more matter in this classification; it is a clause in the 3d, which identifies with, or includes in the great mass of the people, a set of political personages, " who are striving to acquire office or in-" fluence" by the dispossessal (as ought not

to have been omitted) of another set! This is felicitous and apt—very *pat* to the times, though not to the purpose; for either of which, as well as on account of its greater truth and simplicity, I rather, on the whole, prefer Sancho's division of mankind into two orders—the HAVES and the HAVE NOTS! A division, which not only comprehends in it all the politicians in the world, and their *objects*, but also the rest of the human family; to whom, it is distressing to witness, that politicians have the inclination to do so little good, and the power of doing so much mischief! A rivalry, in the political views of these three orders, is next assumed by the Reviewers, as having *necessarily* terminated in a compromise, (observe, a *compromise*, on the part of the people, of *their rights and interests!)* which still preserves the balance in effect, (the explanation of which effect the reader shall shortly see) although with a change in its original mode of operation; which they thus account for (pages 411 and 412). In the early stage of our government, when "the business of legislation for the "whole kingdom did not occupy three or "four weeks in the year, this absolute par- "tition of the business and privileges of the "three orders was in some measure practi- "cable, the constitution was in reality very "near what it has ever since been repre- "sented in theory. In process of time, "however, when the business of govern- "ment became more complicated and "operose, the greatest inconvenience "must have been experienced from this en- "tire separation of the three estates of "which it was composed, and some expe- "dients must have been devised for giving "them a greater sympathy and mutual con- "tact in their proceedings." Now, nothing is more undeniable, than that increased business will require augmented attention. And, really, if the members of one House of Parliament, were also members of the other, and were required to discuss the same measures in different places (as happens when JUDGES are PEERS, which never ought to happen, the spirit of APPELLANT judicature being extremely impaired by it) a good deal of wasted time might, doubtless, be saved by adopting any mode of confederating them, which would make one discussion do for all. But, since this cannot be the case, since each House must, first or last, separately and exclusively, agitate and legislate by itself; since all proceedings, which are common to both, may be simultaneous in both Houses, so that the members of the one may, at the same instant, agitate the same question with the other, if they think proper, (and, as, if they do not, there is no reason to suppose they will be better employed) I protest, I see not only no inconvenience resulting from encreased business, obviated, and no political good saved; but, on the contrary, a great deal lost, and a great deal of inconvenience produced by any device, which tends to give the houses "a "greater sympathy and mutual contact in "their proceedings." And, as the purpose for which this sympathy is desired, is stated (p. 415) to be that of obtaining for the support of *government* (which words mean, *for the support of the measures of any ministry* *) a decided and "PERMANENT MAJO- "RITY" (p. 417) in the House of Commons, by throwing into it all the influence of the Aristocracy and the Crown, (by which means, the sense of the real representatives of the people can never be ascertained at all) I think the recommended "sympathy" is not only the bane of all public spirit, but I assert it to be the very antipathy of our popular constitution. It is to protect the representatives of the people from such recommended "sympathy," and from every influence of every kind, that their privileges have been secured to them; (privileges, *in some respects*, not likely to be very useful to *honest* men), and it is to secure our peerage from every factious contact, either with the people, (whose legislators and judges they are born) or with the crown (of which they are the hereditary advisers) that their independent permanent dignities, and exclusive privileges have been confirmed to them, *after two revolutions*; dignities and privileges, in any other view of their operation, absurd and injurious in many respects to a nation. Next, say the Reviewers, (p. 412) "it ne- "ver could have been but *most injurious* to "the state and country at large, that the "House of Lords, for example, should "throw out by a great majority an impor- "tant bill, which the House of Commons "had passed by a great majority, or that "the King should reject *with indignation*" (these very terms are a palpable *hyperbole*, and in the highest degree ridiculous; for, "*le Roi s'avisera*" being the constitutional

* I am aware it may be said, that a part of these echoes of the peers do vote in opposition to the ministry for the time being. The reader must judge, whether the people gain any thing by this deduction from the strength of government. In other words, is the opposition factious, (and only excited by the hope of attaining the reins of government, which it would guide in the same manner) or is it *principled?*

language of rejection, why reject "*with in-*" *dignation?*") "a law, which had received "the decided approbation of both Houses "of Parliament." These assumptions of great and diametrically opposite majorities are extreme cases, which could not occur in the ordinary course of legislation betwixt two concurring assemblies, *possessing good intentions*, whose powers and privileges are defined. That I may meet any supposition, I however accept them. But, I am so far from admitting the truth of this hypothesis of fanciful "*injury*," that I am clear of a contrary opinion, which I thus maintain.—The measure "*passed in the Commons by a* "*great majority*," to be so thrown out "*by a great majority in the House of* "*Lords*," (agreeably to the vigorous spirit of our constitution,) or to be "*sympatheti-*" *cally*" suppressed by the Lords in the House of Commons, (according to the *new* constitution of the Reviewers) must be admitted to be, in itself, either a good measure or a bad one. If a good one, such conduct in the Lords must necessarily be factious or unprincipled in the grossest degree; and as a good measure, in which ever way they act, whether by clandestine emissaries in the Commons or openly in their own House, is, by the assumption, to be lost to the nation by their opposition, (the only question being between loss by "sympathy," or notoriety,) I contend it to be clearly beyond doubt, better for the country, that such a good measure, if to be lost by the Lords at all, should be openly rejected by them in their own House, and thus ostensibly miscarry, (because the Commons uninfluenced and independent (by this supposition,) have an obvious remedy for such factious behaviour of the Lords, quite adequate to allay any commotion in the country) than that such a good measure should be got rid of, be strangled and suppressed by the clandestine, "*sympathizing*" interference of the Lords by their representatives in the House of Commons. The country in the former case has the advantage over what it would have in the latter, that a man has who is exposed to the attack of an open enemy, in lieu of that of a secret assassin. Not to mention, that "a "*permanent majority*" once obtained by corruption, or by any influence whatever in the House of their representatives, leaves the people without hope or resource, but in rebellion. For, if the clandestine influence of the Lords by their representatives in the House of Commons, be (as by the assumption) considerable enough to cause a popular good measure to miscarry in *that* assembly, the people can have no hope of its being afterwards successfully revived by the Lords in *their own*. Their chance, therefore, of obtaining the good measure in question, is utterly, in this case, foreclosed. But, in the other alternative of my proposition, if the measure be a *bad* one, which is so carried by a great majority of the Commons, (and which cannot be assumed, without an included admission, that members are factious or corrupt), I contend that such *bad* measure, so voted, by a factious or corrupt House of Commons, could not be rejected by too great a majority in the Lords—the greater the better—the more satisfactory to, and the safer for the country. It would, I readily acknowledge, be a great national misfortune, to have one or other branch of the legislature so perverse, so corrupt, or so badly constituted, as to make it possible for a good measure to be lost, or a bad one to be carried in either House, by a great majority; but, if (as by the assumption of the Reviewers) so much faction, or corruption in the legislature, as to make this possible, is to exist, it cannot with a reference both to the good, and to the ultimate tranquillity (which is its good) of the country, manifest itself too openly. An evil so palpably such, that no one pretends to defend it, is half cured. And it may be observed, that did the Commons really speak the sense of the people, (which, on most occasions, would be the equivalent, and synonim of consulting their interests,) and did the peers maintain their constitutional independence, the very supposition of such cases, as those put by the Reviewers, would be ridiculous. But if the legislature become so corrupt, as to make the cases put by the Reviewers those of probable contemplation, as of possible contingency, are we to connive at, or, what is worse, are we to hear such a system defended, on the ground of the unanimity or "*sympathy*," which so vile a dependance on the part of the Commons is to produce in the government? If fair and *above-board* "contact" be all that is contended for between the two Houses, the practice of conferences has provided for that already. Let that practice continue, which is quite adequate to produce all the "sympathy" that ought to be produced.——The extent of injury, which can accrue from want of unanimity in two branches of the legislature, *may be assigned;* but the extent is incalculable, which may result from the *change*, which the Reviewers alledge to have silently happened in the constitution, (and in my opinion profligately defend)—*a translation from the hands of the people of England to the crown and the aristocracy*, (by means of

their dependant emissaries in the House of Commons) *of the chief legislative authority!* Let us view this in another light. The members of the House of Peers, for example, either have, or have not the virtue, independence, wisdom and moderation ascribed to that illustrious body. I give no opinion as to the fact. But this in the very teeth of the Reviewers, I will affirm, and challenge them to disprove; that if these attributes *do belong* to the Lords, they can no where be so creditably, so honourably, and therefore so *efficiently* exercised and applied, as in their own exclusive assembly, where their virtues, &c. &c. &c. would have full play without allay or counteraction. On the other hand, if the ascription of these attributes to them be gratuitous, and that in fact, they do not belong to them, I must contend, that the introducing the representatives of an *aristocracy, without virtue, independence, wisdom, or moderation,* into the House of Commons, is by no means calculated to *improve* that assembly! There is indeed one case, and only one, in which such an amalgamation might be supposed likely to improve the Commons; but the supposition is obviously too fanciful to proceed upon, without better authority, though I do not think it can be disproved; being, that the Commons might have even *less* of all these qualities than themselves. It is just worth observing, that in this commerce "of contact and sympa-"thy" the emissaries of the peers, and the crown are only to *impart* virtue, not to *receive* any. They are to constitute the "permanent majority," by whom the business of government is to be carried "*smooth-*"*ly on*," without "*jerks*," &c.—They are not sent to be influenced by the Commons to consent to popular measures; but they are sent that the Commons may be influenced by them to forego such measures. There is to be action, but no reaction; in short, they are to outvote the Commons; which is the plain English of "the sympathy and the con-"tact," and of all that involution of verbose sophistry.—The last case put by the Reviewers, that of "the King resisting with indig-"nation a law, which had received the de-"cided approbation of both Houses of Par-"liament," I think it not worth considering; as being a case which, if both, or either of the Houses possessed the confidence of the country, never could happen; or, if *in such circumstances,* it did; the injury though it might be very serious to the King himself, would be of very slight importance to the nation. And I cannot avoid observing, that it would be a much more patriotic employment in such a juncture as the present, to endeavour to point out some practicable means for restoring the legislature to this confidence, (which the Reviewers alledge it to have lost) than to be making nugatory hypotheses for countenancing a system of corruption, whose necessary operation it is, to make the government odious, and the people contemptible.——The grand error in all this argument, in which the Reviewers have demonstrated their *inclination* at least to defend a base cause, consists in their having confounded (I fear *wilfully)* the object with the instrument—the *means* of government with its *end.* With this intention they trifle through several pages upon the dangers and inconveniences which would result from the *independent operation* of the three estates, as if their lethargic harmony had been the *summum* of our constitutional polity, whose very *existence* is founded upon *their strife;* and its *end,* the security of the rights and liberties of the people; or, as if their sleep had been the equivalent of good government—whilst the fact is, that the harmony of the orders is very indifferent to the people; to whose interests, it is only essential, that they should act conscientiously and right! A scope of acting, in which mankind is too corrupt ever to be *unanimous;* though a great mind, in *its contention* with the baser passions, may cause it, in the main and upshot, to prevail. As for the "har-"mony and sympathy" recommended by the Reviewers, too much of them savour strongly of collusion, and connivance; and will always be so suspected by the sensible part of mankind. It was to secure the rights and liberties of the people from any combination for their destruction, that the constitutional *checks* upon the several orders, nay, the very orders themselves, were preserved: For the accomplishment of this grand object, our ancestors on behalf of the *people* considered *their* having a *substantive* voice in the legislature to be essential; and never dreamed, that a system could have been pretended to be for their good, which, in its very germ, would stain, *with dishonour* (pages 407 and 19) both the constituent, and the representative.—For it appears assumed, quite *to their own satisfaction,* (though, doubtless, falsely) by the Reviewers, that by this operative *principle of dishonour,* the government now acts in the House of Commons.—Nay, they go so far as to declare, that without this "permanent" (that is, according to them, *influenced,* that is, *corrupted,* that is, *degraded)* "majority, the government could nei-"ther be *stable nor respectable!*" To talk of checks upon power, by the assumption,

that "every separate interest has its organ "in the House of Commons" (p. 413) is the prattle of children. The plain question lies in a nut shell—DO THE FREE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS CONSTITUTE ITS MAJORITY? The answer to this, resolves the argument. On its own account, it is not worth remarking, that in the whole of their copious theory, not an individual allusion is made, in support of their opinions, to any celebrated epoch in our history, from which, civil liberty dates an existence, or derives a confirmation; nor to any constitutional writer whatsoever. The only authority appealed to is, that of another Scotch metaphysician (Hume); a name, whatever its merited reputation in other matters, of, at least, *suspicious* authority in this. The essay, they refer to, begins with the very ominous and *credible* assumption of the maxim (in so many words):—THAT EVERY POLITICIAN IS TO BE CONSIDERED A KNAVE. In which, I concur with that philosopher, and to oppugn which, I have discovered nothing (after the most attentive perusal) in the Edinburgh Reviewers. But I refer to him, in order to quote the following from the same Essay; which the Reviewers, perhaps, satisfied with a *general acquiescing* recollection, have not lately read.—"Every court or senate is de- "termined by the greater number of voices; "so that if selfish views influence only the "*majority* (as they will always do) the "whole senate follows the allurement of "this separate interest, *and acts as if it* "*contained not one member who had any* "*regard to public interest and liberty!!!*" (Essay on Independence of Parliament.)—I proceed to p. 414. "The great object to "be accomplished was not so much to save "the House of Commons from the morti- "fication of having their bills stopped by "the lords, or rejected by the sovereign, "as to protect these two estates from the "direct exercise of this privilege. By the "vast and rapid increase of *wealth* and *in-* "*telligence* in the country at large, the "consideration and relative authority of that "branch of the government which stands "most in connection with it, was sudden- "ly and prodigiously enlarged, &c. &c." Here their argument, not unworthy of its predecessors, obviously amounts to this: that whereas, when the Commons of England were comparatively mean, and contemptible, they had an efficient voice in the legislature by their representatives; and, whereas, they are now become considerable, "*rich* and *intelligent*," it is, *therefore*, fit, that this wisdom, wealth and respectability should be counteracted; and that instead of possessing the weight, and exercising the controul, which they *actually* exercised over the legislature, (p. 411) whilst they were mean and contemptible, they should now have none at all! In their justification (p. 416) of "the interference of peers in elec- "tions" and of "the sitting of placemen in "the House of Commons," by their alledged impossibility of preventing either, I wholly differ with the Reviewers; for I think nothing more easy, although I as certainly think, that where half a dozen *scoundrels*, in a rotten borough, are empowered by law to return two persons to represent *them* in parliament, public honour, and liberty, in such a case, suffer no more from the interference of a peer, than of a commoner patron. But as to *placemen* in parliament, and its being in their power, notwithstanding any regulations, which could be made, to sit in the House of Commons, *until they got their* PLACES, (p. 418) although they might be prevented from sitting there afterwards, I beg to suggest to the Reviewers, and their friends, a receipt for curing even this desperate evil—a cure simple and radical—and which, on these accounts, will never be applied, viz: the prohibiting for 10, or 20 years, or for life, every representative of the people from accepting any *office of emolument* under the crown; and any office whatever (though merely honorary) during the time of representation. And in this prohibition, I especially include all OFFICES OF STATE. For, it is by no means necessary, but on the contrary very unnecessary, and preposterous, that SECRETARIES OF STATE, CHANCELLORS OF THE EXCHEQUER, LORDS OF THE TREASURY, ADMIRALTY, *&c. and heads of other departments* holding offices during pleasure under the crown, should be trustees at all for the interests of the people. The very profits of some of these places (the exchequer for instance, and many more) depending on the amount of the sums voted by these very persons themselves in parliament. The famous DUKE OF BUCKINGHAM, (not the MARQUIS) in one of his speeches, describes a farce, where an actor holds a dialogue with himself, speaking first in one voice, and then answering himself in another; and declares, that this is not more unnatural, than for a member of parliament to ask first in the king's name for such a sort of supply, deliver an account from him of how much is needful, and then give by his ready vote, what he had before asked by his master's order. He afterwards adds, "all we "would prevent, is, that a good rich cor-

"poration should not chuse to entrust with "their liberties a plain honest country "neighbour, and find him within 6 months "changed to a profound cunning courtier." —So say I, and as to the *great officers*, place them in the House of Commons, in the same predicament, in which the constitution formerly placed them, and still contemplates them, in the House of Lords; where the secretaries of state, attorney and solicitor generals, have, to this day, their regular writs of summons, "*ad tractan-*"*dum et consilium impendendum*," though not "*ad consentiendum*." The dispensing with their attendance in the House of Peers, and the making them members of the House of Commons, is a "*sympathetic*" improvement only of modern times. The *votes* of these great personages being found possibly more valuable to the country in the "con-"coctions of measures" in the House of Commons, than their *counsel* in the House of Peers!—"*They* are not much afraid of "the influence of noble families," next say the Reviewers, (p. 417) which I believe. But, when they add, in allusion to peers being parliamentary patrons, that it is not "a debasing or ungenerous influence," I must decidedly differ with them. To the Reviewers, indeed, who have written an express treatise in defence of political corruption, parliamentary, or any other sort of sycophancy, may possibly seem no debasement. But in this respect every man will judge *of them*, and feel *for himself*. For me, I can consider nothing more debasing, than the acceptance of an aweful public trust, requiring the best, and *freest* exercise of my capacity, the right of conscientiously discharging which, I previously agree to surrender! And whether this surrender be made to a peer, or an upstart nabob, does not in my opinion, (though it does in the Reviewers',) in any respect alter its baseness—which regards the surrend*erer* only, not the surrend*ere*e. It appears, without any blush, that the Reviewers (p. 418) treat "sinecure places or pensions" as "*mere* "*trifles*;" adding, that the most rigorous reformer would not state the sum total at a *million* annually. To the Reviewers, possibly, whose ideas march in a parallel with our extravagant national expenditure, the sum of a million may seem "a mere trifle." To me, it seems a scale of very princely corruption! but the despair is not wholly in its amount, immense though it be—the *damnable* consideration is the way in which, and *the purposes*, for which, it is applied.—The *particular* arguments of the Reviewers, as far as I can discover them, are now exhausted, and my first letter gave the *general* view. I will subjoin two resulting remarks. 1st, That the histories of all governments shew, that the gradation from a state of general political corruption to a state of political slavery is insensible, and *certain*; and although the latter is the *sharper* evil, the former condition is the most hopeless, and the most base; whilst the familiarizing the country to a corrupt, and degenerate constitutional theory, seems the natural preparative for reconciling it to its practice. 2d, The great instigators to *total* revolution, are those, who endeavour to shew, that the beautiful theory of our constitution is delusion; that the carrying it back to its principles would do no good, because those principles are not better than our actual abuses; consequently, that there is but one option—the resulting inconveniences, such as we feel them, are to be submitted to, or the *irreparable* building pulled down to its foundations! The Reviewers, who prefer the former, appear to have adopted the ingenious torment of Procrustes; and as they found it would have been impossible to reconcile the abuses to the constitution, have fitted the constitution to its abuses.—I am now to take my leave of the political misprisions of the Edinburgh Reviewers—in doing which, justice urges me to give them, in other respects, their well earned praise. In clearing modern literature of its Augean rubbish, they enjoined themselves a labour for Hercules, and they have performed it with his strength; the canons of taste and criticism have had no abler expositors; and in the bold censures which they have pronounced on bad and careless productions, they have not only become the incitements to fine writing, but like their illustrious Grecian predecessor have exhibited its example.—"*Si sic* "*omnia!*" With such impressions, I cannot but have felt the fearful odds of this contention; which nothing but the fullest conviction, that I had all the truth on my side of the argument, could have made me encounter. I hope I have in some instances vindicated the spirit of the constitution from their aspersions; in others, I believe I have detected their sophistries; and, I *know*, I have had no object but truth. My style, with many other faults, of which I am conscious, but have not leisure to correct, I offer with much good humour a victim to their critical severity.—Let that, and those, fall! Happy—if the illustrious fate of Nisus be mine: "*Moriens animam abstulit hosti.*"

——J. C. Worthington.—*Southampton, Dec.* 1, 1807.

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